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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
TYLER MCLAUGHLIN AKA ABEL, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 44474 
 
          Ada County Case No.  
          CR-2013-734 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has McLaughlin failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing a unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed, upon his guilty plea to 
robbery? 
 
 
McLaughlin Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 McLaughlin pled guilty to robbery and the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed.  (R., pp.94-97.)  McLaughlin filed a notice of 
appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.98-100.)   
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McLaughlin asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his age, bipolar disorder 
and purported willingness to take mental health medication, problems with his vision, 
sentences for robberies he committed in the State of California, and because, he 
claims, “the crime [he] committed was not that serious.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-5.)  The 
record supports the sentence imposed.   
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard 
considering the defendant’s entire sentence.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)).  It is presumed that the 
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement.  Id. 
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).  Where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing 
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).  To carry this burden the 
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the 
facts.  Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.  A sentence is reasonable, however, if it 
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the 
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.  Id.   
The penalty for robbery is not less than five years, up to life in prison.  I.C. § 18-
6503.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed, 
which falls well within the statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.94-97.)  Furthermore, 
McLaughlin’s sentence is appropriate in light of the seriousness of the offense, 
McLaughlin’s history of criminal conduct, and the risk he presents to the community.   
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McLaughlin has a history of violent and criminal behavior.  His record includes 
juvenile adjudications for assault causing bodily injury to a family member, assault 
causing bodily injury, terroristic threat, unlawfully carrying a weapon, and providing false 
identification, as well as several probation violations.  (PSI, pp.10-11.1)  Between May 
2011 and April 2012, McLaughlin was charged with robbery in Texas; robbery and 
burglary in Idaho; three counts of robbery in Santa Clara County, California; and 
possession of burglary tools, receiving known stolen property, vandalism, three counts 
of burglary, and two counts of robbery in San Mateo County, California.  (PSI, pp.12-
13.)  In the instant offense, committed in March 2012, McLaughlin entered a Subway 
restaurant, handed a note to the cashier stating that “this was a robbery and to give him 
money and not make a scene,” threatened a second employee by stating that “he had a 
gun and would kill her if she tried to stop him,” and then fled with approximately $300.00 
in cash.  (PSI, p.9.)  Several months later, McLaughlin’s vehicle was “seized after it had 
been involved in an accident in which the driver fled the scene, and inside officers 
located receipts from Idaho, New Mexico, Oregon, and Nevada,” “[s]everal demand 
notes,” and a hooded sweatshirt and a glove matching those he wore in the instant 
offense.  (PSI, p.9.)  McLaughlin was also “a suspect in three robberies that occurred in 
Utah.”  (PSI, p.9.)   
McLaughlin “denied committing any of the robberies”; however, he was 
subsequently convicted of robbery in San Mateo County, California and, at the time of 
 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
“McLaughlin 44474 psi.pdf.”   
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sentencing in this case, he still had outstanding warrants for the robberies in Santa 
Clara County, California.  (PSI, pp.9, 12-13.)  In 2014, while incarcerated in California, 
McLaughlin barricaded his cell and refused to allow deputies enter, broke an exterior 
window, and attempted to escape using a “makeshift” rope.  (PSI, pp.3-4.)   
After he was paroled in the San Mateo County case, McLaughlin was extradited 
to Idaho to answer for the instant offense.  (PSI, p.13; Tr., p.35, Ls.22-25.)  At 
sentencing, the state noted, “I think this is a serious offense.  Robbery has a maximum 
of life to reflect the serious nature and the danger it places people in.”  (Tr., p.27, Ls.14-
16.)  The state went on to argue that it did not appear that McLaughlin was “taking this 
process seriously.”  (Tr., p.27, Ls.23-25.)   
McLaughlin blames his bipolar disorder – and the fact that he stopped taking his 
mental health medication at the age of 18 because he “no longer wanted to” – for his 
decision to go on a multi-state “crime spree” at age 20.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.1, 4; PSI, 
pp.10, 17.)  However, the district court correctly pointed out that McLaughlin had 
previously committed numerous crimes – including multiple violent crimes – during the 
years that he was taking mental health medications.  (Tr., p.30, Ls.11-17.)  This fact 
does not indicate that McLaughlin is likely to cease his criminal behavior should he 
choose to resume his mental health medication regimen.  Furthermore, McLaughlin’s 
purported willingness to medically manage his mental health issues on a consistent 
basis is questionable, given that he did not take any mental health medications in the 
six years preceding sentencing in this case, and that he believes he “‘has really good 
control over’ his mental health” despite not taking his medication.  (PSI, pp.7, 17.)   
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Contrary to McLaughlin’s assertion that the district court did not consider his 
vision problems and did not adequately consider his mental health issues when it 
imposed his sentence (Appellant’s brief, p.4), the district court specifically articulated its 
consideration of McLaughlin’s mental health and vision problems as mitigating factors, 
stating: 
 I will tell you that, from my view, the sentence is a lenient one, given 
your criminal history and the crime that you committed in this case.  The 
reason I’m imposing what I view as a lenient sentence is because there is a 
great deal of mitigation in your case. 
 
 Probably, first and foremost, is what you point out to me, mental 
illness.  Additionally, you had an extremely difficult time growing up.  You 
had a lot of adverse circumstances that most people don’t have to suffer 
through, and not least of which is your declining eyesight. 
 
(Tr., p.42, Ls.8-20).  The district court considered all of the relevant information and 
imposed a reasonable sentence.  McLaughlin’s sentence is appropriate in light of the 
serious nature of the offense, McLaughlin’s ongoing criminal conduct, and the risk he 
presents to society.  Given any reasonable view of the facts, McLaughlin has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion.   
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Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm McLaughlin’s conviction and 
sentence. 
       
 DATED this 11th day of January, 2017. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming   _________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
 
